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HOW TRIBE AND STATE COOPERATIVE
AGREEMENTS CAN SAVE THE ADAM WALSH ACT
FROM ENCROACHING UPON TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY
I. INTRODUCTION
President George W. Bush signed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act of 2006 (AWA) into law on July 27, 2006.1 Congress passed the
AWA to expand the national sex offender registry, strengthen federal
penalties for crimes against children, and prevent sexual predators from
reaching children on the internet. 2 To achieve these purposes, the AWA
requires that states, territories, and Indian tribes maintain sex offender
registration and notification programs; punishes those sex offenders who fail
to comply with such registration programs; and limits access to child
pornography. 3
Although the AWA has inspired growing academic dialogue since its
enactment in 2006,4 it has inspired little academic criticism on behalf of
American Indian tribes.5 Indian tribes have challenged that section 127 6 of
the AWA encroaches upon existing federal Indian law and policy promoting
tribal sovereignty. 7 On one hand, ―non-Public Law 280 tribes‖8 have argued

1. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587,
(2006) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16901). The AWA honors John and Reve Walsh for their
dedication to the well-being and safety of America‘s children and marks the 25th anniversary of the
abduction and murder of their son, Adam Walsh. Id. § 2.
2. See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: The Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety
Act
of
2006
(July
27,
2006),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060727-7.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
3. Pub. L. No. 109-248, §§ 111(a), 112, 113, 117, 504, 120 Stat. at 593–94, 629 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911–13, 16917; 18 U.S.C. § 3509). The sex offender registration and notification
requirements constitute the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). § 101, 120
Stat. at 190 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16901).
4. See, e.g., Lara Geer Farley, The Adam Walsh Act: The Scarlet Letter of the Twenty-First
Century, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 471 (2008); Caitlin Young, Note, Children Sex Offenders: How the
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act Hurts the Same Children it is Trying to Protect , 34
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 459 (2008).
5. A review of law review articles that have discussed the AWA revealed only two articles that
have discussed the AWA as related to Indian tribes. See Timothy J. Droske, Correcting Native
American Sentencing Disparity Post-Booker, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 794 n.414 (2008); James Park
Taylor, Bespeaking Justice: A History of Indigent Defense in Montana, 68 MONT. L. REV. 363, 410
(2007).
6. § 127, 120 Stat. at 599 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16927).
7. See, e.g., The Nat‘l Cong. of Am. Indians, Urging Congress to Amend Section 127 of the
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that the AWA threatens to encroach upon tribal sovereignty because tribes
must retrocede sex offender registration and notification responsibilities
where they fail to comply with the AWA.9 On the other hand, ―Public Law
280 tribes‖ have argued that the AWA extends beyond the scope of
criminal/prohibitory and civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction delegated to states
under Public Law 280.10 Furthermore, tribes have argued that Congress
passed the AWA without any tribal input.11
This Comment proposes that because the AWA threatens the tribal
sovereignty of both non-Public Law 280 and Public Law 280 tribes, Congress
should amend the AWA to require tribe and state cooperative agreements to
carry out AWA sex offender registration and notification functions.
Part II examines the development of tribal sovereignty as qualified by the
federal trust relationship. It addresses current federal and state criminal and
civil jurisdiction over Indian country, which qualify tribal sovereignty in the
name of the federal trust relationship. It concludes by discussing Public Law
280, which delegated to several states criminal/prohibitory and
civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction over Indian country and severely qualified tribal
sovereignty in the name of the federal trust relationship.
Part III examines both non-Public Law 280 and Public Law 280 tribes‘
argument that the AWA encroaches upon current federal Indian law and
policy promoting tribal sovereignty. Part III suggests that the AWA threatens
tribal sovereignty in non-Public Law 280 states because the AWA may
retrocede sex offender registration and notification responsibilities to the state,
where non-Public Law 280 tribes fail to comply with the AWA‘s
requirements. It recognizes, however, that section 127 does not extend
beyond the scope of criminal/prohibitory and civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction
delegated to states over Public Law 280 tribes, where courts construe the
AWA registration provisions as a criminal/prohibitory law. Nonetheless, Part
III suggests that the federal district courts‘ response to Ex Post Facto Clause
challenges to the AWA, finding the AWA registration provisions a civil law,
does support Public Law 280 tribes‘ argument that section 127 extends
beyond the scope of jurisdiction delegated to states under Public Law 280.

Adam
Walsh
Act,
Res.
#ECWS-07-003
(Feb.
26,
2007),
http://ncai.org/ncai/resource/documents/governance/Adam_Walsh_Act/07-003_Adam_Walsh.pdf
[hereinafter NCAI Resolution].
8. See infra text accompanying notes 53–64 (explaining Public Law 280).
9. Sarah Deer, Widening the Gap: Adam Walsh Act Raises Concerns, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY, Mar. 28, 2007, at A3.
10. Id.; see also NCAI Resolution, supra note 7.
11. The NCAI notes, ―[The AWA] addresses Indian tribes and was included without any
hearings, consultation or consideration of the views of tribal governments and current tribal
practices.‖ NCAI Resolution, supra note 7.
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Part IV proposes that Congress should consider amending section 127 of
the AWA to (1) strike the provision that unilaterally delegates sex offender
registration and notification responsibilities to Public Law 280 states and (2)
require that both non-Public Law 280 and Public Law 280 tribes and states
adopt cooperative agreements to establish sex offender registration and
notification programs that comply with the AWA. Part IV encourages
Congress to follow the footsteps of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA) and again resolve tribe and state jurisdictional conflict by requiring
cooperative agreements. It suggests that amending section 127 would permit
tribes and states to develop ―custom-fit‖ sex offender registration and
notifications programs that comply with AWA. It concludes in suggesting
that amending section 127 would ultimately promote current federal Indian
law and policy promoting tribal sovereignty.
II. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AS QUALIFIED BY THE FEDERAL TRUST
RELATIONSHIP
Part II examines the development of tribal sovereignty as qualified by the
federal trust relationship. Subpart A examines the roots of tribal sovereignty
and the federal trust relationship. Subpart B examines current federal and
state criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian country, which qualify tribal
sovereignty in the name of the federal trust relationship. Subpart C discusses
Public Law 280, which delegated to several states criminal/prohibitory and
civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction over Indian country and greatly qualified tribal
sovereignty in the name of the federal trust relationship.
A. The Roots of Tribal Sovereignty and the Federal Trust Relationship
From as far back as 1787, Indian tribes have been concerned with
protecting their tribal sovereignty from federal and state encroachment. 12
Broadly speaking, sovereignty is ―[s]upreme dominion, authority, or rule.‖ 13
Specifically, sovereignty includes the recognition by others as a sovereign, a
land base, the power of self-defense, a treaty-making power, an economic
system, and the lack of subordination to other sovereigns. 14 However, tribal
sovereignty is qualified sovereignty—it yields to the plenary power of
Congress and, in turn, the federal trust relationship. 15 To date, tribes‘ right to
12. See STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES: THE AUTHORITATIVE
ACLU GUIDE TO INDIAN AND TRIBAL RIGHTS 6 (3d ed. 2004).
13. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1430 (8th ed. 2004).
14. See PEVAR, supra note 12, at 12–13.
15. PEVAR, supra note 12, at 32 (As originally conceived by the United States Supreme Court,
the federal trust relationship constitutes the bargain between tribes and the U.S. government—in
exchange for millions of acres of tribal land, the government promised to provide tribes protection;
respect; and food, clothing, and services.); see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978);
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determine tribal membership is the only tribal sovereignty attribute
consistently upheld in federal Indian law and policy. 16 Nonetheless, since the
1960s, existing federal Indian law and policy have favored tribal
sovereignty.17
Qualified tribal sovereignty dates to early nineteenth century United States
Supreme Court decisions.18 In just over ten years, Chief Justice John
Marshall penned what federal Indian law scholars commonly refer to as ―The
Marshall Trilogy‖:19 Johnson v. M’Intosh,20 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,21
and Worcester v. Georgia.22 These three decisions would become the
foundation for qualified tribal sovereignty. 23
Johnson v. M’Intosh did not speak directly to the notion of tribal
sovereignty, but it established Indian Title or Aboriginal Title, the right to
occupy lands from ―time immemorial.‖24 As ―Court[] of the conqueror,‖ the
Supreme Court encroached upon a primary attribute of tribal sovereignty,
tribal land base, but solidified what remained—a federally protected right of
occupancy.25
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia resembled Marbury v. Madison,26 which
avoided eroding the legitimacy of the Supreme Court by refusing to hear the
petitioner‘s writ of mandamus27 and established an enduring principle of
federal Indian policy that limits tribal sovereignty—the federal trust
relationship. 28 Marshall declined to hear the Cherokee Nation‘s bill ―praying
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
16. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
17. PEVAR, supra note 12, at 12–13; see, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18
(1987) (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978) (―[A] proper respect both for
tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area [providing a federal
forum for civil actions against tribal officers] cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear
indications of legislative intent.‖) (alterations in original).
18. See WILLIAM CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 72 (4th ed. 2004).
19. Droske, supra note 5, at 728; Philip J. Prygoski, From Marshall to Marshall: The Supreme
Court’s Changing Stance on Tribal Sovereignty, COMPLEAT LAW., Fall 1995, at 14, 15.
20. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
21. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
22. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
23. See, e.g., Droske, supra note 5, at 728; Prygoski, supra note 19.
24. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 549–50.
25. Id. at 588; see, e.g., Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317 (1942) (holding
that fishing and hunting rights are inherent with a ―right of occupancy‖ or Indian title). But see TeeHit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (holding that Indian title does not create rights
against taking or extinction by the United States subject to a right of compensation).
26. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
27. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176–80; WILLIAM EDWARD NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE
ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 70 (2000).
28. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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[for] an injunction restraining the state of Georgia from the execution of
certain laws . . . [alleged] to annihilate the Cherokees as a political society.‖ 29
He also rejected the argument that tribes were foreign states in the sense of the
Constitution but recognized tribes as ―domestic dependent nations‖ whose
―relation to the United States [resembled] that of a ward to his guardian.‖30
Although Cherokee Nation denied the tribes‘ injunction request, it
established the two sides of the ―federal trust relationship‖ coin. On one side,
Marshall held that tribes were subject to federal government authority as the
―ward to his guardian.‖31 On the other side, Marshall held that the federal
government had a responsibility of pupilage and guardianship. 32 Thus, the
federal trust relationship qualifies the federal government‘s authority and
power over tribes.33
Worcester v. Georgia built upon the federal trust relationship coin that
Marshall established in Cherokee Nation and embraced tribal sovereignty
against state encroachment. 34
Here, Marshall used the federal trust
relationship and an exclusive right to engage in commerce to justify federally
regulated intercourse with Indian nations as ―distinct political communities.‖ 35
Marshall therefore held that ―the laws of Georgia can have no force‖ within
the Cherokee Nation.36 In sum, Worcester bolstered tribal sovereignty to
protect tribes from state control and solidified qualified tribal sovereignty as
subject to the authority of the federal government as conqueror. 37
In addition to ―The Marshall Trilogy,‖ two other cases have expanded
upon the notion of qualified tribal sovereignty. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock
demonstrated the extent of Congress‘s power over tribes. 38 In particular, the
Supreme Court held that Congress‘s power over tribes is plenary, subject to a
presumption of good faith, and ultimately non-judiciable to the extent of
preempting inquiry into fraudulent misrepresentations leading to the
extinction of tribal land. 39 Additionally, Williams v. Lee established the
―infringement test‖ that governed the scope of state action and interference

29. Id. at 15.
30. Id. at 17.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 295 (1942) (holding that federal
government breached the trust relationship by failing to prevent misappropriation of trust funds by
tribal treasurer).
34. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
35. Id. at 556–57.
36. Id. at 561.
37. Id.
38. 187 U.S. 553, 565–68 (1903).
39. Id.
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over tribal sovereignty. 40 Specifically, the Supreme Court characterized the
―infringement test‖ as follows: ―[A]bsent governing Acts of Congress, the
question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.‖41
B. Federal and State Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction over Indian Country
1. Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Country
Congress passed several expansive legislative acts that qualified tribal
sovereignty over criminal jurisdiction in the name of tribal interest and the
federal trust relationship. 42 Immediately following the Revolutionary War,
Congress passed legislation to extend federal criminal jurisdiction over crimes
committed in Indian country by non-Indians against Indians ―as part of the
overall federal policy of providing a buffer between the non-Indian and Indian
populations.‖43 Subsequently, Congress enacted the General Crimes Act to
extend federal criminal jurisdiction to cover all crimes in Indian country
except (1) crimes committed by Indians against Indians, (2) crimes committed
by Indians who receive punishment by the tribe, and (3) crimes over which a
treaty gives exclusive jurisdiction to the tribe. 44 Congress further qualified
tribal sovereignty over criminal jurisdiction when it passed the Major Crimes
Act, which expanded federal criminal jurisdiction over seven severe crimes
committed by Indians against Indians. Today, the Major Crimes Act extends
federal criminal jurisdiction over fourteen severe crimes.45
While Congress expanded federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian
country, the Supreme Court eroded tribal criminal jurisdiction and held that
tribes have no general criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 46 The Court
held that ―[w]hile not conclusive on the issue before us, the commonly shared

40. 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); Indian Country Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1152 (2006).
43. CANBY, supra note 18, at 133 (citing 1 Stat. 138 (1790); 1 Stat. 743 (1799); 2 Stat. 139
(1802)).
44. Id. at 133–34; General Crimes Act, Ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (1817) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1152 (2006)).
45. Major Crimes Act, Pub. L. No. 94-297, § 2, 90 Stat. 585 (1976) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (2006)); see also PEVAR, supra note 12, at 78, 389 (The Major Crimes Act originally
authorized the federal government to prosecute murder, manslaughter, rape, assault, assault with
intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny. Subsequently Congress amended the Major Crimes Act to
include incest, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, assault
against an individual who has not attained the age of sixteen years, robbery, and theft among others.
§ 2, 90 Stat. at 585.)
46. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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presumption of Congress, the Executive Branch, and lower federal courts that
tribal courts do not have the power to try non-Indians carries considerable
weight.‖47 Accordingly, the Court concluded that ―[b]y submitting to the
overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily
give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a
manner acceptable to Congress.‖48
2. Civil Jurisdiction over Indian Country
Although Congress also took numerous measures to qualify tribal
sovereignty over civil jurisdiction in the name of the federal trust relationship,
federal and state civil jurisdiction over Indian country seems narrower than
federal criminal jurisdiction. For instance, state courts lack jurisdiction over
civil claims made by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country. 49
Similarly, state courts lack civil jurisdiction between tribal members. 50
However, Indian tribes lack civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on non-Indian
fee land unless (1) the nonmembers entered into a consensual relationship
with the tribe or its members or (2) ―conduct threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe.‖51 Nonetheless, the Indian Commerce Clause grants the federal
government plenary power over tribes, which includes the power to delegate
jurisdiction to the states, as demonstrated in Public Law 280. 52
C. Public Law 280: A Federal Grant of Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction to
States
Passed in 1953 during the ―Termination Period,‖53 Public Law 280 is
perhaps the most expansive piece of legislation that qualifies tribal
sovereignty as it pertains to criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian
47. Id. at 206.
48. Id. at 210.
49. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959).
50. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 388 (1976).
51. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 654 (2001); Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981).
52. U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 3 (―Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.‖); Act of Aug. 15, 1953,
Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006) (criminal); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360 (2000) (civil)).
53. CANBY, supra note 18, at 58 (During the Termination Period, Congress passed legislation
that served to terminate both the special ―Trust Relationship‖ between the federal government and
the tribes as well as tribes themselves); see also Emma Garrison, Baffling Distinctions Between
Criminal and Regulatory: How Public Law 280 Allows Vague Notions of State Policy to Trump
Tribal Sovereignty, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 449, 451 (2004) (Congress also passed Public Law
280 ―[i]n order to relieve the strain on federal resources and better address rampant lawlessness in
Indian country and inadequate tribal courts.‖).
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country.54 On one hand, Public Law 280 states 55 have jurisdiction to enforce
their criminal laws inside and outside Indian country. 56 Specifically, Public
Law 280 reads:
Each of the States . . . shall have jurisdiction over offenses
committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian
country . . . to the same extent that such State or Territory has
jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the
State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such State or
Territory shall have the same force and effect within such
Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State or
Territory.57
Consequently, neither the General Crimes Act nor the Major Crimes Act
applies in Public Law 280 states.58
On the other hand, Public Law 280 states have civil jurisdiction inside and
outside Indian country. 59 Specifically, the Public Law 280 reads:
Each of the States listed . . . shall have jurisdiction over civil
causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are
parties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed . . . to
the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other
civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State that
are of general application to private persons or private
property shall have the same force and effect within such
Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State. 60
In Bryan v. Itasca County, the Supreme Court interpreted this statutory
language to ―authorize[] application by the state courts of their rules of
decision to decide [civil] disputes‖—in short, Public Law 280 delegated to
states civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction over Indian country. 61 Despite Public
54. PEVAR, supra note 12, at 122–23.
55. I will refer to states where Public Law 280 applies as ―Public Law 280 states.‖ I will also
refer to tribes to whom Public Law 280 applies as ―Public Law 280 tribes.‖ Public Law 280 applies
in Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Id. The remaining forty-four
states received the option of assuming criminal jurisdiction over Indian tribes. Id. at 156.
56. Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 2, 67 Stat. 588, 588–89.
57. § 2(a), 67 Stat. at 588.
58. § 2(c), 67 Stat. at 589.
59. § 2, 67 Stat. at 589.
60. § 4, 67 Stat. at 589.
61. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 384 (1976). Nonetheless, Public Law 280 exempts
three substantive areas from state criminal or civil jurisdiction: (1) ―the state may not tax, encumber,
or alienate Indian trust property,‖ (2) ―[the state] may not regulate the use of Indian trust property in
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Law 280, tribes may also exercise civil jurisdiction within Indian country if
they exercise it in compliance with pertinent federal Indian law. 62 Taken
together, Public Law 280 confers two types of jurisdiction to states over
Indian country—criminal/prohibitory and civil/adjudicatory.63 By contrast,
Public Law 280 did not confer civil/regulatory jurisdiction. 64
Unfortunately, whether a Public Law 280 state law applies in Indian
country seems anything but clear-cut, for the courts have struggled to
distinguish between criminal/prohibitory and civil/regulatory laws. 65
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians explained the distinction as
follows:
[I]f the intent of a state law is generally to prohibit certain
conduct, it falls within Pub. L. 280‘s grant of criminal
jurisdiction, but if the state law generally permits the conduct
at issue, subject to regulation, it must be classified as
civil/regulatory and Pub. L. 280 does not authorize its
enforcement on an Indian reservation. The shorthand test is
whether the conduct at issue violates the State‘s public
policy.66
Critics argue that the Cabazon test seems ambiguous and subject to
manipulation because the Court neglects to define the ―conduct at issue.‖67
Additionally, the test seems amorphous because courts consider public policy
to construe state legislation that is neither a clear-cut criminal nor civil law. 68
Unsurprisingly, state courts that have applied the Cabazon test have reached
inconsistent results for nearly identical statutes that pertain to traffic laws,
family laws, and fireworks laws.69
Courts in Public Law 280 states have reached differing results where they
construe state driving laws because the states regulate some aspects of driving
any manner that conflicts with federal law,‖ and (3) ―the state may not deprive an Indian or tribe of
federally guaranteed hunting, fishing, or trapping rights and the right to license, control, and regulate
the same.‖ PEVAR, supra note 12, at 156.
62. Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 559–62 (9th Cir. 1991);
Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 2000 WI 79, ¶ 32, 236
Wis. 2d 384, ¶ 32, 612 N.W.2d 709, ¶ 32.
63. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 (1987).
64. Id.
65. Timothy J. Droske, Comment, The New Battleground for Public Law 280 Jurisdiction: Sex
Offender Registration in Indian Country, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 897, 904–05, n.54 (2007).
66. 480 U.S. at 209 (emphasis added).
67. Droske, New Battleground, supra note 65, at 904–05 n.54 (citing State v. Stone, 572
N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 1997)).
68. Garrison, supra note 53, at 459.
69. Id. at 459–68.
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itself, such as licensing and other automobile requirements, while prohibiting
others, such as dangerous driving.70 On one hand, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals has held that ―Minnesota does not prohibit driving, but instead
generally permits the larger activity of driving, subject to regulatory
limitations.‖71 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that
because Washington amended its traffic code to decriminalize certain traffic
offenses, provisions applying to speeding constituted a civil/regulatory law
not enforceable within Indian country. 72
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that
Wisconsin‘s motor vehicle licensing statute served to deter dangerous driving
and constituted a criminal/prohibitory law. 73 Likewise, the Idaho Supreme
Court has held that traffic offenses constituted criminal/prohibitory law; in
doing so, the court focused primarily on the definition of traffic laws as
criminal in the state constitution and prior case law that deemed them
criminal.74 Nonetheless, most Public Law 280 courts have held that state laws
that serve to deter driving while intoxicated constitute criminal/prohibitory
laws within the states‘ Public Law 280 jurisdiction. 75
Similar to state driving laws, courts in Public Law 280 states have reached
differing results where they must construe family law because these laws
address both the need to protect children as well as the need to regulate child
custody agreements. 76 For example, state courts have reached differing
results where they confront challenges to statutes that address felony injury to
a child.77 On one hand, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that although a
statute was added to the civil/regulatory laws that protect children, such as
Idaho‘s Child Protective Act or Parent-Child Relationship Termination Act,
such a statute constituted a criminal/prohibitory law because it prohibits injury
to children. 78 On the other hand, the Northern District Court of California has
held that the state‘s child welfare statutes constitute civil/regulatory law
because they generally permit the conduct of parenting. 79 Further yet, the
70. Id. at 459–65; see also Arthur F. Foerster, Comment, Divisiveness and Delusion: Public
Law 280 and the Evasive Criminal/Regulatory Distinction, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1344–46 (1999).
71. Garrison, supra note 53, at 460 (discussing Stone, 557 N.W.2d at 591).
72. Id. at 460–61 (discussing Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation v. Washington,
938 F.2d 146, 148–49 (9th Cir. 1991)).
73. Id. at 461 (discussing St. Germaine v. Cir. Ct. for Vilas County, 938 F.2d 75, 77 (7th Cir.
1991)).
74. Id. at 462 (discussing State v. George, 905 P.2d 626, 631 (Idaho 1995)).
75. Id. at 463–64 (discussing Bray v. Comm‘r of Public Safety, 555 N.W.2d 757, 761 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1996); State v. McCormack, 793 P.2d 682, 686 (Idaho 1990)).
76. Id. at 465–67.
77. Id. at 465.
78. Id. at 465–66 (discussing State v. Marek, 777 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989)).
79. Id. at 466–67 (discussing Doe v. Mann, 285 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1237 (N.D. Cal. 2003)).
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district court departed from the Cabazon test because it believed that tribal
courts did not have adequate resources to assume jurisdiction over Indian
child welfare matters.80
Courts in Public Law 280 states have similarly construed statutes that
confront fireworks sales and use as criminal/prohibitory in some states and
civil/regulatory in other states.81 On one hand, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has held that a California fireworks statute constituted a
criminal/prohibitory law despite the fact that the California Health and Safety
Code described the statute as regulatory and the fact that the statutory scheme
established permits and licensing fees. 82 On the other hand, a Wisconsin court
of appeals embraced the argument that because the Wisconsin legislature
titled the statute that confronted fireworks sales and use as ―Regulation of
Fireworks‖ and established permits and exceptions, the statute was a
civil/regulatory law.83 The Wisconsin court rejected the state‘s argument that
the legislature passed the statute to prevent costly forest fire because ―[t]he
sale of fireworks, for good or bad, does not violate this State‘s public
policy.‖84 Taken together, these cases show that courts may easily manipulate
the Cabazon test because the guiding signpost, whether the conduct at issue
violates state public policy, provides inconsistent results.85
Although few courts have considered whether sex offender registration
and notification laws are criminal/prohibitory or civil/regulatory, the
Wisconsin and Minnesota state supreme courts have agreed that sex offender
laws are probably criminal/prohibitory laws. 86 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
has held that a law providing for civil commitment of sexually violent persons
was a criminal/prohibitory law where Wisconsin prohibited the conduct ―at
the heart‖ of the law—sex offenses. 87 Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has held that Minnesota unequivocally prohibited ―the narrow conduct
of a predatory offender residing or moving without maintaining a current

80. Id.
81. Id. at 467–68.
82. Id. at 467 (discussing Quechan Indian Tribes v. McMullen, 984 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir.
1993)).
83. Id. at 467–68 (discussing State v. Cutler, No. 94-1464, 1994 WL 656820, at *3 (Wis. Ct.
App. Nov. 22, 1994)).
84. Id.
85. Garrison, supra note 53, at 468–69.
86. See State v. Jones, 729 N.W.2d 1, 7–8 (Minn. 2007); In re Commitment of Burgess, 2003
WI 71, ¶ 19, 262 Wis. 2d 354, ¶ 19, 665 N.W.2d 124, ¶ 19.
87. Burgess, 2003 WI 71, at ¶ 19, 262 Wis. 2d at ¶ 19, 665 N.W.2d at ¶ 19. The court also
noted that the civil commitment laws would also constitute civil/adjudicatory laws because they
―‗have to do with private rights and status‘ [such as an] adjudication of . . . mental health.‖ Id. at
¶¶ 20–21 (quoting Daniel H. Israel & Thomas L. Smithson, Indian Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty and
Economic Development, 49 N.D. L. REV. 267, 296 (1973)).
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address registration with the appropriate authorities.‖88 The Minnesota
Supreme Court therefore held that the state requirement that sex offenders
maintain a current address registration fell within the criminal/prohibitory
jurisdiction conferred by Public Law 280.89
III. TRIBES‘ CONCERNS WITH SECTION 127 OF THE AWA
Part III examines tribes‘ argument that the AWA encroaches upon the
current federal Indian law policy of promoting tribal sovereignty. Tribes argue
that section 127 of the AWA encroaches upon the existing federal Indian law
policy of tribal sovereignty in both non-Public Law 280 and Public Law 280
states.90 In other words, as the National Conference of American Indians
(―NCAI‖) and its brethren have noted, section 127 is ―an expansion of state
jurisdiction that will unnecessarily complicate the already confusing system of
criminal jurisdiction on tribal lands.‖91 Although Congress has plenary power
to enact legislation such as the AWA and delegate authority to the states, 92 the
tribes‘ challenge that the AWA departs from current federal Indian law and
policy favoring tribal sovereignty is significant because federal Indian law and
policy has historically shifted as a ―pendulum‖ between overregulation in the
name of the federal trust relationship and promoting tribal sovereignty. 93
Consequently, any departure from current federal Indian policy may indicate
an unwanted shift in federal Indian law and policy away from tribal
sovereignty and toward assimilation or oppression. 94
Subpart A suggests that the AWA threatens tribal sovereignty in nonPublic Law 280 states because the AWA may retrocede sex offender
registration and notification responsibilities to the state, where non-Public
Law 280 tribes fail to comply with the AWA‘s requirements. Subpart B
recognizes, however, that section 127 does not extend beyond the scope of
criminal/prohibitory and civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction delegated to states
88. Jones, 729 N.W.2d at 7–8.
89. Id. at 8.
90. See NCAI Resolution, supra note 7. Additionally tribes have urged that the AWA departed
from the federal Indian policy of ―self-determination‖ because it does not allow tribes to assume
responsibility for sex offender registration as they develop the capacity and resources to do so. Nat‘l
Cong. of Am. Indians, Urgent Action Needed: One Month Until the Adam Walsh Act Deadline!
(2007), available at http://ncai.org/fileadmin/governance/07_036_AdamWalshAct_1_.pdf.
91. NCAI Resolution, supra note 7.
92. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. (―Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.‖); Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–68 (1903).
93. See EMMA R. GROSS, CONTEMPORARY FEDERAL P OLICY TOWARD AMERICAN INDIANS
11–12 (1989)); PEVAR, supra note 12, at 4 (citing ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW, at vi–vii (3d ed. 1991)).
94. See PEVAR, supra note 12, at 13–14.
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over Public Law 280 tribes, where courts construe the AWA registration
provisions as a criminal/prohibitory law. Nonetheless, subpart B suggests that
the federal district courts‘ response to Ex Post Facto Clause challenges to the
AWA, finding the AWA registration provisions a civil law, does support
Public Law 280 tribes‘ argument that section 127 extends beyond the scope of
jurisdiction delegated to states under Public Law 280.
A. Non-Public Law 280 Tribes’ Challenge to Section 127 of the AWA
Non-Public Law 280 tribes challenge that section 127 of the AWA
threatens to encroach upon existing tribal sovereignty where it requires tribes
to retrocede its sex offender registration and notification responsibilities
where tribes fail to implement them. 95 At the outset, section 127 allows nonPublic Law 280 tribes to elect to carry out sex offender registration and
notification functions.96 However, section 127 delegates to the Attorney
General the authority to retrocede these functions to the state in which the
tribe resides, where a non-Public Law 280 tribe cannot ―substantially
implement‖ the requirements after electing to do so. 97 Nonetheless, section
127 permits a non-Public Law 280 tribe to delegate its responsibilities to
another jurisdiction in which the tribe is located where it believes it cannot
carry out the registration and notification responsibilities.98
Digging deeper, non-Public Law 280 tribes‘ challenge to section 127
seems even more persuasive because non-Public Law 280 tribes appear
unable to finance independent registration and notification programs. 99 The
AWA allocates funds for registration and notification programs on the basis
of performance and compliance—awarding supplemental funds for
compliance and reductions for failure. 100 The AWA therefore disparately
impacts tribes unable to comply solely upon their own funds because tribal
95. Deer, supra note 9. The AWA created the ―SMART Office,‖ which ―administers the
national standards for sex offender registration and assists the states with questions throughout the
implementation process.‖ Lara Geer Farley, The Adam Walsh Act: The Scarlet Letter of the TwentyFirst Century, 47 WASHBURN L. J. 471, 483 n.102 (2008); see also The National Guidelines for Sex
Offender Registration and Notification, 72 Fed. Reg. 30,210, 30,211 (May 30, 2007) (proposed
guidelines).
96. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 127(a), 120
Stat. 587, 599–600 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16927(a)).
97. Id. § 127(a)(2)(C).
98. Id. § 127(a)(1)(B).
99. See NCAI Resolution, supra note 7; Deer, supra note 9; Jerry Reynolds, Sovereignty Issues
Plague Adam Walsh Act, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Apr. 2, 2008, at A3; Jodi Rave, Tribal Leaders
Testify to Congress on Mandate to Register Sex Offenders, THE MISSOULIAN, July 18, 2008,
available at http://www.missoulian.com/articles/2008/07/18/jodirave/rave46.prt; John Gramlich,
States
to
Enforce
Molester
Law
on
Tribal
Land,
May
15,
2008,
http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=309820.
100. § 125(b)(4), 120 Stat at 587, 599 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16925(b)(4)).
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justice systems have long suffered from inadequate funding. 101 Additionally,
many tribes have not previously participated in sex offender registration and
notification programs, so non-Public Law 280 tribes may require more
resources and technical support as compared to states. 102 Non-Public Law 280
tribes also seem ―ill-prepared to compete with more sophisticated applicants
in a competitive grant process.‖103 In sum, historically inadequate tribal
justice system funding, inexperience, and steep competition for federal
funding renders the AWA a potential encroachment upon tribal sovereignty in
non-Public Law 280 states.104
B. Public Law 280 Tribes’ Challenge to Section 127 of the AWA
Public Law 280 tribes challenge that section 127 of the AWA extends
jurisdiction to states beyond the Public Law 280 delegation of
criminal/prohibitory and civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction. Applying the Public
Law 280 jurisprudence laid forth by the Wisconsin and Minnesota supreme
courts, which construes sex offender legislation as a criminal/prohibitory law,
section 127 does not extend beyond the scope of criminal/prohibitory and
civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction delegated to states under Public Law 280.
Nonetheless, the federal district courts‘ response to Ex Post Facto Clause
challenges to the AWA, finding the AWA registration provisions a civil law,
does support Public Law 280 tribes‘ argument that section 127 extends
beyond the scope of jurisdiction delegated to states under Public Law 280.
1. Applying Public Law 280 Jurisprudence to the AWA Registration
Provisions
Public Law 280 tribes challenge that section 127 of the AWA threatens to
encroach upon tribal sovereignty because it automatically delegates to states
the authority to carry out sex offender registration and notification functions
101. Maria Odum, Money Shortage Seen as Hindering Indian Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
1991, at B.16.
Odum writes:
The disparities between most courts in the country and Indian tribal courts have
long been conceded, but there is increasing concern among American Indians,
civil rights officials and some members of Congress that these disparities,
caused in large part by inadequate financial support, are depriving litigants in
the tribal system of their civil rights.
Id.
102. Letter from Joe Garcia, NCAI President, to Laura Rogers, Director of SMART Office,
U.S.
Dept.
of
Justice
(June
1,
2007),
available
at
http://www.ncai.org/ncai/resource/documents/governance/Adam_Walsh_Act/grant_letter.pdf.
103. Id.
104. NCAI Resolution, supra note 7.

2008]

ADAM WALSH ACT AND STATE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS

399

for Public Law 280 tribes.105 Section 127 does not permit Public Law 280
tribes to ―elect‖ to carry out registration and notification functions.106 Instead,
section 127 treats Public Law 280 tribes as if they
[E]lect[ed] to delegate [their] functions under this subtitle to
another jurisdiction or jurisdictions within which the territory
of the tribe is located and to provide access to its territory and
such other cooperation and assistance as may be needed to
enable such other jurisdiction or jurisdictions to carry out and
enforce the requirements of this subtitle. 107
Public Law 280 tribes‘ challenge to section 127 depends on whether the
AWA registration and notification laws constitute civil/regulatory or
criminal/prohibitory laws.108 However, based on the two Wisconsin and
Minnesota supreme court decisions addressing sex offender registration laws
as applied within Indian country, 109 section 127 seems to extend state
criminal/prohibitory jurisdiction over tribes consistent with Public Law
280.110 More specifically, because federal law prohibits the type of sexual
conduct at the heart of the AWA, the AWA would appear criminal/prohibitory
under Wisconsin law. 111 Similarly, because the federal law prohibits ―the
narrow conduct of a predatory offender residing or moving without
maintaining a current address registration with the appropriate authorities,‖
the AWA appears criminal/prohibitory under Minnesota law.112
Additionally, section 127 of the AWA perhaps allows Public Law 280
tribes and states to establish cooperative agreements to carry out the
registration and notification functions, and this provision defends, albeit to a
limited extent, against critics‘ claims that the Act encroaches upon tribal
sovereignty.113 In particular, cooperative agreements seem consistent with the
105. Id.; Deer, supra note 9; Rave, supra note 99; Reynolds, supra note 99.
106. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248,
§ 127(a)(2)(A), 120 Stat. 587, 600 (2006) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16927(a)(2)(A)).
107. § 127(a)(1)(B), 120 Stat. at 600.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 53–64.
109. State v. Jones, 729 N.W.2d 1, 7–8 (Minn. 2007); In re Commitment of Burgess, 2003 WI
71, ¶ 19, 262 Wis. 2d 354, ¶ 19, 665 N.W.2d 124, ¶ 19.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 65–89.
111. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 102, 120
Stat. 587, 590 (2006) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16901); Burgess, 2003 WI 71, ¶ 19, 262 Wis. 2d
354, ¶ 19, 665 N.W.2d 124, ¶ 19 . Nonetheless, I dismiss arguments that the AWA would constitute a
civil/adjudicatory law because, unlike civil commitment proceedings, sex offender registration laws
seem more akin to taxing and franchising than to ―private rights and status.‖ Burgess, 2003 WI 71,
¶ 20, 262 Wis. 2d 354, ¶ 20, 665 N.W.2d 124, ¶ 20 (citing Israel & Smithson, supra note 87, at 296).
112. Jones, 729 N.W.2d at 7–8.
113. Section 127(b)(2) states that:
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widely shared belief that Public Law 280 did not deprive Public Law 280
tribes and their courts of concurrent jurisdiction over civil matters.114
Nonetheless, section 127, as written, does not require Public Law 280 states to
enter into cooperative agreements with tribes. 115
2. Applying Ex Post Facto Clause Doctrine to the AWA Registration
Provisions
a. Ex Post Facto Clause Doctrine
Article I, Section 9, clause 3 of the United States Constitution states, ―No
Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.‖116 Primarily, the Ex
Post Facto Clause prohibits Congress and the states from passing any law
―which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time
it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then
prescribed.‖117 Legislation violates the Ex Post Facto Clause where two
elements are present: (1) the legislation must apply retroactively, and (2) the
legislation must disadvantage the retrospective offender.118 In other words, ―if
a statute merely alters penal provisions . . . it violates the Clause if it is both
retrospective and more onerous than the law in effect on the date of the
offense.‖119
Courts that apply the Ex Post Facto Clause doctrine should determine
whether the legislature, by passing a statute, intended to establish ―‗civil‘
proceedings.‖120 Legislative intent to impose punishment after the fact is a

A tribe may, through cooperative agreements with such a jurisdiction or
jurisdictions—
(A) arrange for the tribe to carry out any function of such a jurisdiction
under this subtitle with respect to sex offenders subject to the tribe‘s
jurisdiction; and
(B) arrange for such a jurisdiction to carry out any function of the tribe
under this subtitle with respect to sex offenders subject to the tribe‘s
jurisdiction.
120 Stat. at 600.
114. Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 559–62 (9th Cir. 1991);
Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 2000 WI 79, ¶ 32, 236
Wis. 2d 384, ¶ 32 , 612 N.W.2d 709, ¶ 32.
115. § 127(b)(2), 120 Stat. at 600.
116. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3.
117. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981) (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 277, 325–26 (1867)).
118. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29–30.
119. Id. at 30–31.
120. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997). The Supreme Court seems to
characterize civil and criminal ―proceedings‖ more generally than state courts that decide Public Law
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prima facie Ex Post Facto Clause violation. 121 By contrast, if the legislature
intended to impose a civil and nonpunitive regulatory scheme, then a statute
constitutes an Ex Post Facto Clause violation where it is ―‗so punitive either
in purpose or effect as to negate [the State‘s] intention‘ to deem it ‗civil.‘‖ 122
Courts consider seven factors to analyze the effects of a law:
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding
of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence,
[5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [7] whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned.123
Courts must defer to legislative intent, and ―‗only the clearest proof‘ will
suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated
a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.‖124 Ultimately, the Ex Post Facto
Clause doctrine analysis is an exercise in statutory construction or
interpretation.125
Recently, the United States Supreme Court applied the Ex Post Facto
Clause doctrine to Alaska‘s state sex offender registration laws and
determined that the registration laws did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause.126 To begin, the Court determined that the Alaska legislature intended
the sex offender registration laws to impose a civil, nonpunitive regulatory
scheme. 127 Subsequently, the Court determined that Alaska‘s civil and
nonpunitive sex offender registration laws were not ―so punitive‖ in either
purpose or effect to negate Alaska‘s legislative intent. 128

280 jurisdictional disputes. Therefore, the Court‘s use of the term ―proceedings‖ does not seem to
overlap with Public Law 280‘s delegation of civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction. Id.; see also In re
Commitment of Burgess, 2003 WI 71, ¶¶ 20–21, 262 Wis. 2d 354, ¶¶ 20–21, 665 N.W.2d 124,
¶¶ 20–21 (explaining civil/adjudicatory proceedings).
121. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
122. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1980)).
123. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963) (emphasis omitted).
124. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100
(1997)).
125. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361).
126. Id. at 84, 106.
127. Id. at 96.
128. Id. at 97–106.
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b. The AWA Sex Offender Registration Provisions
The AWA, through the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA) provisions, requires sex offenders to register and notify local
authorities where the sex offender moves interstate into another community. 129
Specifically, the AWA requires ―a sex offender [to] register, and keep the
registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the
offender is an employee, and where the offender is a student.‖ 130
Additionally, the AWA increases the punishment to up to ten years
imprisonment for sex offenders who (1) are required to register, (2) travel in
interstate commerce, and (3) knowingly fail to register or update
registration.131 Finally, the AWA delegates the Attorney General authority:
[T]o specify the applicability of the requirements of this title
to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this Act
[enacted July 27, 2006] or its implementation in a particular
jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for the registration of any
such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders
who are unable to comply with subsection (b) [Initial
registration].132
Criminal defendants have challenged that applying the AWA
retrospectively for failing to register as a sex offender between July 27, 2006,
when Congress passed the AWA, and February 28, 2007, when the Attorney
General declared that the AWA applied retroactively to sex offenders
convicted before its enactment, is an Ex Post Facto Clause violation. 133
129. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, §§ 112–113,
120 Stat. 587, 593–94 (2006) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16912–13).
130. Id.
131. Id. at ch. 109B, sec. 2250, § 141, 120 Stat. at 601–02 (to be codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2250).
132. Id. § 113(d). The Attorney General exercised his authority to apply the AWA
retrospectively on February 28, 2007. Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 28 C.F.R. § 72.3
(2007).
133. See United States v. Natividad-Garcia, 560 F. Supp. 2d 561 (W.D. Tex. 2008); United
States v. Gillette, 553 F. Supp. 2d 524 (D. Virgin Islands 2008); United States v. Ditomasso, 552 F.
Supp. 2d 233 (D.R.I. 2008); United States v. Madera, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (M.D. Fla. 2007)
overruled, in part, by United States v. Madera 528 F.3d 852, 859 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Gill, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (D. Utah 2007); United States v. Stinson, 507 F. Supp. 2d 560 (S.D. W.
Va. 2007); United States v. Hinen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 747 (W.D. Va. 2007); United States v. Akers, No.
3:07-CR-00086(01) RM, 2008 WL 914493 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 3, 2008); United States v. Dixon, No.
3:07-CR-72(01) RM 2007, WL 4553720 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 18, 2007); United States v. Elliott, No. 0714059-CR, 2007 WL 4365599 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2007); United States v. Adkins, No. 1:07 -CR-59,
2007 WL 4335457 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 7, 2007); United States v. Cardenas, No. 07-80108-CR, 2007 WL
4245913 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2007); United States v. Howell, No. CR07-2013-MWB, 2007 WL
3302547 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 8, 2007); United States v. Beasley, No. 1:07-CR-115-TCB, 2007 WL
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Although one federal appellate court has attempted to provide guidance, 134
federal district courts have responded to Ex Post Facto Clause challenges in
two ways. First, federal district courts have focused on the section 2250
provision that increased punishment for failing to register, distinguished these
provisions from the Alaska registration laws in Smith, and held that the AWA
provision violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. 135 Second, federal district courts
have focused on the section 16912 registration provision, recognized that
these provisions compare to the Alaska registration laws, and held that the
AWA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 136
c. Reconsidering Public Law 280 Tribes’ Challenge
The federal district courts‘ response to Ex Post Facto Clause challenges to
the AWA, finding the AWA registration provisions a civil law, supports
Public Law 280 tribes‘ argument that section 127 extends beyond the scope of
jurisdiction delegated to states under Public Law 280. Although the
Wisconsin and Minnesota supreme courts have interpreted sex offender
registration laws as criminal/prohibitory law under Public Law 280
jurisprudence, 137 the Supreme Court and federal district courts have
interpreted the AWA sex offender registration laws as civil law under Ex Post
Facto Clause doctrine. 138 In other words, courts have interpreted the AWA
registration provisions differently under Public Law 280 jurisprudence than
Ex Post Facto Clause doctrine.
Nonetheless, the Cabazon test and subsequent Public Law 280
jurisprudence seems less reliable than the Ex Post Facto Clause doctrine. In
particular, the ―Seven Factor Analysis‖ seems to parse out the distinction

3489999 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 10, 2007); United States v. Deese, No. CR-07-167-L, 2007 WL 2778362
(W.D. Okla. Sept. 21, 2007); United States v. Muzio, No. 4:07CR179 CDP, 2007 WL 2159462 (E.D.
Mo. July 26, 2007); United States v. Templeton, No. Cr-06-291-M, 2007 WL 445481 (W.D. Okla.
Feb. 7, 2007).
134. Madera, 528 F.3d at 859 (holding that the AWA does not apply to defendants who
became sex offenders prior to July 27, 2006, and failed to register prior to February 28, 2007).
However, the Eleventh Circuit passed on Madera‘s general Ex Post Facto Clause challenge. Id.
135. See generally Natividad-Garcia, 560 F. Supp. 2d 561; Gillette, 553 F. Supp. 2d 524; Gill,
520 F. Supp. 2d 1341; Stinson, 507 F. Supp. 2d 560; Howell, 2007 WL 3302547; Beasley, 2007 WL
3489999; Deese, 2007 WL 2778362; Muzio, 2007 WL 2159462.
136. See generally Ditomasso, 552 F. Supp. 2d 223; Akers, 2008 WL 914493; Madera, 474
F. Supp. 2d 1257; Hinen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 747; Dixon, 2007 WL 4553720; Elliott, 2007 WL
4365599; Adkins, 2007 WL 4335457; Cardenas, 2007 WL 4245913; Templeton, 2007 WL 445481.
137. Again, I dismiss arguments that the AWA would constitute a civil/adjudicatory law
because, unlike civil commitment proceedings, sex offender registration laws seem more akin to
taxing and franchising than to ―private rights and status‖ such as an ―adjudication of . . . mental
health.‖ In re Commitment of Burgess, 2003 WI 71, ¶¶ 20–21, 262 Wis. 2d 354, ¶¶ 20–21, 665
N.W.2d 124, ¶¶ 20–21 (2003) (citing Israel & Smithson, supra note 87, at 296).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 116–36.
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between criminal/prohibitory and civil/regulatory laws.139 Although the
―Seven Factor Analysis‖ focuses on whether a law imposes ex post facto
punishment, four of the factors could implicitly examine whether a state law
is criminal/prohibitory or civil/regulatory: (2) whether it has historically been
regarded as a punishment, (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment—retribution and deterrence, and (5) whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime. 140 These relevant factors, as well as the
well-developed area of statutory construction and interpretation applied in
Smith, also seem more concrete than the vague ―conduct at issue‖ inquiry
established in Cabazon.141 Consequently, although the Ex Post Facto Clause
has no legal connection to Public Law 280 jurisprudence, 142 the federal courts
have provided implicit support to reconsider Public Law 280 tribes‘ argument
that the AWA registration and notification laws encroach upon tribal
sovereignty by unilaterally delegating a civil/regulatory responsibility to
Public Law 280 states.
IV. AMENDING SECTION 127 OF THE AWA TO RESIST ENCROACHING UPON
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
Part IV proposes that because the AWA threatens the tribal sovereignty of
both non-Public Law 280 and Public Law 280 tribes, Congress should amend
section 127 of the AWA to require tribe and state cooperative agreements to
carry out the sex offender registration and notification functions. Subpart A
recognizes that Congress has previously enacted legislation that requires
tribes and states to enter into cooperative agreements to regulate activity in
Indian country—the IGRA. Despite confronting similar objections to
amending section 127, Congress again should resolve tribe and state
jurisdictional conflict with legislation requiring cooperation between tribes
and states to carry out sex offender registration and notification.
Subpart B suggests that amending section 127 to require tribe and state
cooperative agreements would promote effective sex offender registration
programs tailored to fit the needs of each tribe. Subpart C similarly suggests
that amending section 127 to require tribe and state cooperative agreements
139. Supra text accompanying notes 116–36
140. See supra text accompanying note 123 for the ―Seven Factor Analysis.‖
141. Compare Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92–106 (2003) with California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 (1987); see also supra text accompanying notes 65–85
(discussing the ambivalence of the Cabazon test to address various state laws).
142. Nonetheless, courts should continuously strive for consistency in law. See Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 849 (1991) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173
(1989), and noting that courts may depart from precedent where it becomes a ―detriment to
coherence and consistency in the law‖).
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would promote current federal Indian law and policy favoring tribal
sovereignty.
A. Following the Footsteps of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
Congress has previously required tribes and states to adopt cooperative
agreements where courts have held that states may not regulate certain
conduct within Indian country—gaming.143 In Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Butterworth, the Fifth Circuit first identified that gaming was a Public Law
280 jurisdictional conflict and held that a state could interfere with tribal
gaming where the state generally prohibited gaming rather than merely
regulated it.144 States responded to gaming profits throughout the 1980s with
resentment, 145 and the United States Supreme Court finally confronted gaming
under Public Law 280 in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.146
Nonetheless, the Court relied upon the criminal/prohibitory versus
civil/regulatory dichotomy and held that California could not enforce local
ordinances against the tribe‘s gaming operations. 147
Congress responded to the Cabazon decision by passing the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act,148 which requires states and tribes to enter into
gaming compacts where the tribe seeks to conduct certain gaming. 149 The
IGRA expressly states the following findings in support of federal regulation
of Indian gaming:

143. See PEVAR, supra note 12, at 320.
144. 658 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 1981). ―Other federal courts followed the Fifth Circuit‘s lead
on this issue and analyzed attempted state interference with Indian bingo under the
regulation/prohibition dichotomy.‖ Daniel Twetten, Public Law 280 and the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act: Could Two Wrongs Ever Be Made into a Right?, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1317, 1339 (2000) (citing Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694
F.2d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir. 1982); Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin, 518 F. Supp. 712, 712 (W.D.
Wis. 1981)).
145. Twetten, supra note 144, at 1340; see also 131 CONG. REC. S4124 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1985)
(statement of Rep. DeConcini); 131 CONG. REC. E2004 (daily ed. May 8, 1985) (statement of Rep.
Shumway); 131 CONG. REC. S4124 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1985) (statement of Rep. DeConcini); 131
CONG. REC. E3060-61 (daily ed. June 27, 1985) (statement of Rep. Shumway).
146. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
147. Id. at 211, 214.
148. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified at
25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000)).
149. See 18 U.S.C. § 1166; 25 U.S.C. § 2710 et seq; PEVAR, supra note 12, at 320; see also
Twetten, supra note 144, at 1340 (―Cabazon capped a decade of significant victories in federal court
for Indians hoping to catch the gaming gravy train. Congress took control of that train, however, in
the year following Cabazon when it passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.‖); 133 CONG. REC.
S15802-03 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1987) (statement of Rep. Hecht) (recognizing that Congress responded
to the Cabazon decision by introducing the IGRA).
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(1) [N]umerous Indian tribes have become engaged in or have
licensed gaming activities on Indian lands as a means of
generating tribal governmental revenue;
(2) Federal courts have held that section 2103 of the Revised
Statutes (25 U.S.C. 81) requires Secretarial review of
management contracts dealing with Indian gaming, but does
not provide standards for approval of such contracts;
(3) [E]xisting Federal law does not provide clear standards or
regulations for the conduct of gaming on Indian lands;
(4) [A] principal goal of Federal Indian policy is to promote
tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and
strong tribal government; and
(5) Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming
activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not
specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted
within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and
public policy, prohibit such gaming activity. 150
In short, Congress stepped in post-Cabazon to resolve the Public Law 280
jurisdictional conflict between states and tribes over gaming regulation.
Accordingly, Congress should again opt to require cooperative agreements
and therefore resolve the jurisdictional tension between states and tribes over
sex offender registration and notification responsibilities in favor of tribal
sovereignty. Congress should find that numerous Public Law 280 Indian
tribes have become engaged in or have sex offender registration and
notification. 151 Congress should also find that the AWA does not provide
clear or effective standards or regulations for delegating sex offender
registration and notification responsibilities between non-Public Law 280 and
Public Law 280 tribes and states.152 Congress should find that a principal goal
of federal Indian policy is to promote tribal economic development, tribal
self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government, and tribes may have financial
difficulty implementing sex offender registration and notification systems. 153
Finally, Congress should find that Indian tribes may have the right to regulate
sex offender registration and notification on Indian lands where sex offender
registration is a civil/regulatory law. 154
Both tribes and states may resist amending the AWA to require
cooperative agreements for similar reasons as the tribes and states that resisted
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

§ 2, 102 Stat. at 2467.
See, e.g., Droske, New Battleground, supra note 65, at 913–28.
See supra text accompanying notes 90–104.
See supra text accompanying notes 99–104.
See supra text accompanying notes 105–42.
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IGRA. First, Public Law 280 states may argue that Public Law 280
jurisprudence delegates AWA registration and notification functions to the
state as criminal prohibitory laws.155 Conversely, both non-Public Law 280
and Public Law 280 tribes may argue that the AWA would encroach upon
tribal sovereignty by requiring tribes to enter into cooperative agreements,
rather than recognizing a tribe‘s right to carry out the AWA registration and
notification responsibilities independently. 156 Both these arguments, however,
seem unpersuasive because of the demonstrated value of cooperative
agreements between Public Law 280 tribes and states to carry out sex offender
registration and notification functions. 157
Second, the U.S. Justice Department ―SMART‖ office158 may argue that
allowing Public Law 280 tribes and states to establish cooperative agreements
to carry out registration and notification functions would create an enormous
amount of varied systems and make monitoring and enforcing the AWA
standards impossible. 159 This argument also seems unpersuasive because the
AWA permits states, territories, and non-Public Law 280 tribes to establish
varied systems that comply with the Attorney General‘s guidelines. 160
Despite resistance from tribes, states, and the United States Justice
Department, Congress should follow the footsteps of the IGRA and consider
amending section 127 of the AWA to (1) strike provisions that unilaterally
delegate sex offender registration and notification responsibilities to the states
and (2) require that both non-Public law 280 and Public Law 280 tribes and
states adopt cooperative agreements to establish sex offender registration and
notification programs that comply with the AWA. To enforce section 127,
Congress could also amend section 125,161 which enables the SMART office
to allocate funds for registration and notification programs on the basis of
155. One argument against passing the IGRA was that the states were appealing the Cabazon
decision to the United States Supreme Court and the IGRA seemed inconsistent with the state‘s
position on Public Law 280 jurisprudence. See 132 CONG. REC. 1421 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1986)
(statement of Rep. Shumway). Here, states would rely on the Wisconsin and Minnesota supreme
court decisions construing sex offender legislation as criminal/prohibitory laws. See supra text
accompanying notes 86–89.
156. One argument against passing the IGRA was that it would limit tribes‘ inherent right to
regulate gaming free of state interference. See 131 CONG. REC. E1315 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1985)
(statement of Rep. Udall) (recognizing tribe‘s inherent right to regulate gaming free of state
interference).
157. See infra text accompanying notes 162–76.
158. See supra note 95.
159. One argument against passing the IGRA was that it ―could result in 50 different sets of
regulations, which would be impossible to monitor or enforce.‖ 132 CONG. REC. E1086-87 (daily
ed. Apr. 10, 1986) (statement of Rep. Vucanovich).
160. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 112, 120
Stat. 587, 593 (2006) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16912).
161. Id. § 125, 120 Stat. at 599 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16925).
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performance and compliance, to allocate funding for tribes and states that
enter into cooperative agreements and establish sex offender registration and
notification systems that comply with the AWA.
B. Establishing Custom-Fit Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Programs that Comply with the AWA
Amending section 127 would encourage tribes and states to develop
―custom-fit‖ sex offender registration and notification programs that comply
with AWA. From the outset, ―scholars and commentators have touted the
value of tribal-state compacts over rigid divisions between tribal and State
sovereignty.‖162 Specifically, tribe and state cooperative agreements have
immense value when dealing with sex offender registration and notification
duties for two primary reasons: (1) states and tribes have the common goal of
providing protection from sex offenders, and (2) no ―one-size-fits-all‖
solution exists.163 The first reason seems self-explanatory—because both
tribes and states have a common interest in protecting the public from sex
offenders, tribes and states should combine efforts to establish sex offender
registration programs.164 The second reason seems more complex yet equally
persuasive; in particular, cooperative agreements allow states and tribes to
accommodate for variables such as size, location, wealth, and interaction with
local enforcement agencies, as well as culture and philosophy. 165
The experience of Minnesota provides a recent example of the benefit of
tribe and state cooperative agreements to establish sex offender registration
programs. 166 Minnesota entered into a range of cooperative agreements with
tribes to fill the gap left by State v. Jones, which initially declared
Minnesota‘s sex offender registration and notification laws did not apply in
Indian country because they were civil/regulatory laws.167 On one hand,
Minnesota established a cooperative agreement with the White Earth Nation
and allowed the tribe to exercise maximum tribal sovereignty by regulating
and enforcing its own registration and notification code with tribal police and
courts.168 On the other hand, Minnesota established a cooperative agreement

162. Droske, New Battleground, supra note 65, at 916.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 916 n.105 (referring to Doreen Hagen, State Should Work Together with Tribal
Governments, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 7, 2005, at 11B).
165. Droske, New Battleground, supra note 65, at 916–19.
166. Id.
167. State v. Jones, 700 N.W.2d 556, 561 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); Droske, New Battleground,
supra note 65, at 916–19.
168. Droske, New Battleground, supra note 65, at 923 nn.149–50 (quoting White Earth
Reservation: Tribe Signs Predatory Offender’s Code, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Sept. 8, 2005, at B2)
(―The tribe viewed its predatory offender registration law as a powerful expression of the White
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with the Leech Lake tribe that mirrored the state‘s criminal/prohibitory
jurisdiction and allowed Minnesota to carry out registration and notification
functions.169 One pragmatic reason why the Leech Lake tribe chose this plan
was its inability to enforce the regulations independently. 170 Finally,
Minnesota established cooperative agreements with the Shakopee and Grand
Portage tribes that combined notions of tribal sovereignty with state resources
and expertise.171 These cooperative agreements stated that Minnesota would
enforce its own registration and notification requirements in the event that the
offender failed to follow tribal registration rules. 172
In short, the experience of Minnesota and its tribes reveals that
cooperative agreements between tribes and states are a vital option to
establishing sex offender registration programs that both satisfy the AWA and
meet the varying needs of tribes. 173 In turn, states benefit from the knowledge
of tribal leaders as to how best to carry out the program within tribes. 174 As
critics of the AWA have suggested, ―To effectively monitor sex offenders
within tribal communities, the tribal governments must be involved.‖175 Laura
L. Rogers, the U.S. Justice Department director of the SMART office, has
agreed: ―[W]hether you represent a tribe, you represent a local entity or you
represent your state . . . we all need to work together in this effort.‖176
C. Promoting Current Federal Indian Law Policy of Promoting Tribal
Sovereignty
Amending section 127 would also promote the current federal Indian law
policy of promoting tribal sovereignty. Critics of Public Law 280 have
contended that the delegation of jurisdiction constitutes a ―unilateral
imposition of jurisdiction over tribes [that] severely infringes upon tribal

Earth Nation‘s ‗inherent sovereignty,‘ and felt the statute would ‗preserve the peace, harmony, and
safety‘ of the White Earth community, and effectively ‗register and prosecute predatory
offenders.‘‖).
169. Droske, New Battleground, supra note 65 at 925–26 (―[S]ince members of the tribal
government believed that the State had done an excellent job in implementing its registration laws
and did not want to water down the law‘s effectiveness by reducing the criminal penalties from a
felony to a misdemeanor, the tribe chose to turn enforcement back to the State.‖).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 927.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 928 (―The collaborative relationship the tribes and the Attorney General have
entered into, and the solutions as a result of these collaborative negotiations, serve as an important
model for other States and tribes that have not yet confronted this issue.‖).
174. Deer, supra note 9.
175. Id.
176. Gramlich, supra note 99.
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sovereignty . . . inconsistent with current federal policy.‖177 From the
beginning, tribes have opposed Congress‘s decision to delegate criminal and
civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction to states without their consent—the decision
blatantly infringed on tribal sovereignty. 178 Consequently, amending section
127 to reflect the position that AWA registration and notification provisions
are civil/regulatory laws promotes tribal sovereignty and self-government.179
Additionally, construing the AWA sex offender registration provisions as
civil/regulatory laws would promote tribal sovereignty by promoting tribestate cooperative agreements.180 As Robert Bohn, lawyer for the Leech Lake
Band of Ojibwe in Minnesota, mentioned at the Federal Bar conference, ―Far
from being an abdication of tribal sovereignty, we believe this was an
extension of our cooperative law enforcement agreement and was the ultimate
expression of government-to-government relations.‖181
V. CONCLUSION
Since July 27, 2006, Indian tribes have challenged that the AWA departs
from current federal Indian law and policy favoring tribal sovereignty. On
one hand, non-Public Law 280 tribes concede that the AWA delegates sex
offender registration and notification responsibilities to tribes. However, nonPublic Law 280 tribes challenge that the financial obstacles to establishing a
sex offender registration and notification programs, coupled with the threat of
retrocession for failure to comply, constitutes a de facto182 delegation of sex
offender registration and notification responsibilities to the states. Therefore,
although the AWA does not purport to encroach upon non-Public Law 280
tribes‘ sovereignty, it threatens to encroach severely upon tribal sovereignty
unless tribal registration and notification programs receive funding at the
outset.
On the other hand, Public Law 280 tribes argue that the AWA departs
from the current Public Law 280 delegation of criminal/prohibitory and
civil/adjudicatory jurisdiction where it delegates sex offender registration and

177. Garrison, supra note 53, at 451.
178. Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation
Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535, 543 (1975); see also WILLIAM A. BROPHY & SOPHIE D. ABERLE,
THE INDIAN : AMERICA‘S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 186 (1966) (Even President Eisenhower lamented
that Congress‘s decision to pass Public Law 280 without Indian tribes‘ consent gave him ―grave
doubts.‖).
179. See generally NCAI Resolution, supra note 7; Droske, New Battleground, supra note 65.
180. See generally NCAI Resolution, supra note 7; Droske, New Battleground, supra note 65.
181. Indianz.com, Tribes Face Deadline to Join National Sex Offender Registry (Apr. 30,
2007), http://www.indianz.com/News/2007/002661.asp (emphasis added).
182. ―Actual; existing in fact; having effect even though not formally or legally recognized.‖
BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 448 (8th ed. 2004).
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notification responsibilities to the states. Although the Wisconsin and
Minnesota supreme courts suggest otherwise, the Public Law 280 tribes‘
argument has some merit, for federal district courts have rejected criminal
defendants‘ Ex Post Facto Clause challenges by construing the AWA
registration provision as civil laws, not criminal laws.
Taken together, Congress should consider amending section 127 of the
AWA to (1) strike provisions that unilaterally delegate sex offender
registration and notification responsibilities to the states and (2) require that
both non-Public Law 280 and Public Law 280 tribes and states adopt
cooperative agreements to establish sex offender registration and notification
programs that comply with the AWA. Congress has previously required tribes
and states to adopt cooperative agreements where courts have held that states
may not regulate certain conduct within Indian country—gaming.
Additionally, amending section 127 would both allow tribes and states to
establish custom-fit agreements to carry out the sex offender registration and
notification functions and promote current federal Indian law and policy
favoring tribal sovereignty. Ultimately, Congress‘s decision to amend section
127 would resist implicit efforts to swing the federal Indian law and policy
―pendulum‖183 toward oppressing Indian tribes.
BRIAN P. DIMMER

183. See EMMA R. GROSS, CONTEMPORARY FEDERAL P OLICY TOWARD AMERICAN INDIANS
11–12 (1989); PEVAR, supra note 12, at 4 (citing ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW vi–vii (3d ed. 1991)).
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